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For over 50 years expected value and expected utility 
theory has been challenged by behavioral findings in 
repeated and single plays of risky gambles. The inherent 
long-term nature of these models has been found to be at 
odds with preferences indicating short-term maximization 
in single play situations. With the present study we provide 
further evidence on the distinction between long-term and 
short-term oriented behavior. Evaluating experienced-
based decisions over repeated and single play situations we 
demonstrate that both choice preferences and search 
behavior change in response to long and short-term 
framing. This suggests different cognitive approaches for 
single and repeated play situations, with single decisions 
often favoring risk-aversion and therefore the 
underweighting of rare events. These findings are in line 
with alternative models of risky choice as for example 
proposed by Lopes (1996) and also the literature on state-
dependent foraging. 
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Over lunch nobel-laureate Paul Samuelson offered his 
colleague the following bet: Win 200$ with a 50% 
chance or lose 100$. To his surprise the colleague 
rejected the offer but mentioned that he would agree to a 
series of a hundred such bets. Samuelson (1963) 
considered the choice of his colleague irrational. He later 
showed how this pattern of choice is incompatible with 
expected-utility maximization. A series of bets, which 
individually are all inacceptable, should not be accepted. 
But is the behavior of Samuelson’s colleague irrational? 
The prevailing answer after 50 years of scientific 
debate seems to be unanimously no. However, very 
different theoretical explanations have been invoked. On 
one hand, it has been demonstrated that the behavior of 
Samuelson’s colleague can indeed be captured by models 
of expected utility theory when the decision is made over 
the aggregated outcome of repeated plays (Aloysius, 
2007). On the other hand, “distinct process differences 
between the situations” (Wedell, 2011) have been 
emphasized. Particularly Lola Lopes argued in favor of a 
two-stage decision process in which the qualitative 
feature of “coming-out-ahead” plays an important role 
(Lopes, 1996; Lopes & Oden, 1999). Formally Lopes 
assumes next to decumulative weighting a second 
process that maximizes the probability of achieving an 
aspiration level.  
Along the lines of Lola Lopes’ explanation, Hills and 
Hertwig (2010) recently provided evidence for a decision 
strategy that focuses on winning most of the time. Hills 
and Hertwig used an alternative paradigm of risky choice 
– decisions from experience – in which the information 
about options is acquired in a prior inconsequential 
sampling phase. They found that the choice behavior of 
people who sampled less and evaluated options in shorter 
intervals – were best described by a “round-wise” 
decision strategy. Instead of aiming at the overall higher 
mean of both options, this strategy compares the options 
over all sampling transitions and tallies the wins. 
Consequently, this strategy favors the option with a 
higher probability of coming out ahead—i.e., the option 
that wins most of the time. The results of Hills and 
Hertwig (2010) indicate that distinct processes are indeed 
at work when people aim for either long-run expected 
value maximization or for short-run maximization that 
focuses on coming-out ahead.  
The distinction between such strategies is prevalent 
also outside the field of human decision-making. For 
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example, risk sensitivity and state-dependent foraging 
explain why a bird that needs food regularly to avoid 
starvation should concern itself with short-term outcomes 
and not seek for the better long-term average, which may 
not come in time (e.g., Caraco, 1980; Houston & 
McNamara, 1999; Stephens, 1981). In the present study 
we build on these ideas by examining information search 
and decision making in single and repeated play 
situations.  
 
Behavioral Findings Under Repeated Plays 
 
Behavioral studies have shown that in repeated-play 
situations—where people get to play the same gamble 
multiple times—people are more likely to act according 
to the principles of expected utility maximization 
(Wedell, 2011). Generally, under repeated plays, the 
preference for the option with the higher expected value 
is substantially increased (e.g. Montgomery & Adelbratt, 
1982). In addition, repeated plays reduce a number of 
well-known decision anomalies including possibility and 
certainty effects (Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; Keren, 
1991), violations of procedural invariance (Wedell & 
Böckenholt, 1990) and ambiguity aversion (Liu & 
Coleman, 2009). 
The effect of repeated plays on choice preference has 
also been established in applied settings. Redelmeier and 
Tversky (1990, 1992) found that physicians make 
differential decisions for individual versus aggregated 
instances. Bernartzi and Thaler (1990) have also 
demonstrated the relevance of the single repeated play 




The goal of the present study is to evaluate the effect of 
single and repeated plays in the context of decisions from 
experience. By incorporating an active sampling phase 
decisions from experience account for the lack of full 
information about the available options in real life; a 
quality that is neglected in the commonly used paradigm 
of decisions from description. Based on the findings of 
Hills and Hertwig (2010) we expect the contrast between 
repeated and single play to impact pre-choice information 
search in addition to preferences. Specifically we expect 
people in single play as compared to repeated play 
situations to draw fewer samples and have shorter 
evaluation intervals for the available options. We also 
expect a higher preference in single play situations for 
options that have a higher probability of winning most of 
the time irrespective of expected. For repeated plays we 
expect the opposite pattern. Such findings would indicate 
an overall differential cognitive approach to single and 
repeated plays of the same gamble and speak in favor of 
choice models such as Lola Lopes’ two-stage account. 
Additionally, we are interested in the degree to which 
the pattern of results is dependent on the certainty of the 
available options. In much of the risky choice literature a 
risky high outcome option is paired with an option that 
offers a smaller but certain outcome. Thereby, the quality 
of “coming-out-ahead” is often confounded with 
certainty. However, given the prior assertions we would 
expect the pattern of results to be largely independent 
over cases where the secure option is certain (or only 
relatively secure). 
Finally, we want to evaluate how the standard 
application of decisions from experience relates to 
situations where the single and repeated-play character is 
made salient. Decisions from experience have recently 
received much attention as they depart from decisions 
that are made based on full description of the options (see 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In this context it will be very 
telling to observe if the overall pattern of results in the 
paradigm used most often in the literature (following 
Hertwig et al., 2004) resembles more a single or repeated 




Participants We collected data from 124 participants. 
The mean age of the sample was about 24.2 years, 85% 
were students of the University of Basel. Participants 
were rewarded either by course credit or a fixed payment 
of about 13$. Every participant also received a 
performance-based bonus as a result of his or her choices. 
 
Materials A set of 12 target problems was created (see 
table 1). Each problem required a choice between two 
gambles. Every gamble was comprised of two outcomes 
– one positive outcome and zero. One gamble posed a 
relatively secure (p>.7) or certain chance (p=1) to win a 
positive outcome. The other gamble was substantially 
more risky (p<=.15). This riskier option was always 
superior in expected value (1.5 to 1.8 times as high). We 
refer to these two options are referred to as the low (L) 
and high (H) expected value options, respectively. For 
control purposes, we included two problems where the 
high outcome options had the lower expected value (C1, 
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C2) and two problems where the supposedly high 
outcome option was actually a sure event of zero (C3, 
C4). Those problems were created to exclude participants 
showing unsystematic or extreme risk seeking behavior.  
 
Procedure The experiment was entirely computer based. 
Participants were given verbal and visual instructions that 
explicitly explained the payoff modality according to 
their assigned experimental condition. Participants then 
made choices for three practice trials. On every problem 
the participants were able to sample from the two options 
as much and in whatever fashion they liked. They were 
instructed to proceed to the decision whenever they felt 
confident enough. Finally the participants made their 
decisions on all 16 problems (12 target and 4 control 
problems) in random order.  
 
Payoff Manipulation The single and repeated play 
character was induced between-subjects through different 
payoff modalities. The payoff in the repeated play 
condition was determined by one hundred draws from 
one of the participant’s chosen options. In the single play 
condition the payoff, one random sample was taken from 
one the participant’s chosen options and then this value 
was multiplied by one hundred. A third condition 
(neutral) corresponded to the payoff modality usually 
applied in the literature (Hertwig et al., 2004), with the 
payoff equivalent to one random draw from each option 
chosen by the participant. As the payoff in the neutral 
condition is based on only 16 draws all presented 
outcomes were multiplied by a fixed factor to equal the 





We applied two criteria to exclude participants showing 
extreme risk seeking or unsystematic behavior. First, we 
excluded participants that neither preferred the higher 
mean nor the higher median in the control problems C1 
and C2 (see table 1). Second, we also excluded 
participants that did not sample at least once from every 
option. As a result the following analyses are based on 82 
out of 124 participants. Inspection of control problems 
C3 and C4 reveals that this restriction very efficiently 
reduces zero EV choices, which can be regarded as an 
indicator for either extreme risk seeking or not very 
systematic behavior. The excluded participants chose the 
zero EV option in about 27% of the cases, whereas the 
included participants chose did not choose this option at 
all. Thus, the remaining participants showed neither 
extreme risk-seeking nor unsystematic behavior. 
The main focus of this study is on the contrast between 
the single and repeated play conditions. Statistical tests 
are therefore mainly reported for this contrast. 
Additionally, comparisons for the neutral condition are 
reported to see where usual experimental instantiations of 
this paradigm fall in the context of salient single and 
repeated play situations. 
Figure 2A illustrates choice patterns over the 
experimental conditions. In support of our predictions, H 
preferences increased for the repeated-play as compared 
to single-play situation (t42.4=3.58, p<.001). H preference 
in the neutral condition resembled the pattern in the 
single-play condition (t53.1=0.54, p=.594), but there was a 
difference for H choices between the neutral and repeated 
play conditions (t43.8=-3.05, p=.004). This effect is not 
affected by the inclusion of the certainty of the L option 
in the prediction of H choices (X22=.51, p=.776). Because 
none of the following analyses were influenced by a 
comparison of certain and uncertain gambles, the 
following results are collapsed over both problem types. 
Table1: Study problems 
 
 
Problem H L 
1 92 with p=.05 3 with certainty 
2 34 with p=.05 1 with certainty 
3 120 with p=.05 5 with p=.70 
4 44 with p=.05 2 with p=.70 
5 70 with p=.10 4 with certainty 
6 16 with p=.10 1 with certainty 
7 54 with p=.10 4 with p=.75 
8 23 with p=.10 2 with p=.75 
9 35 with p=.15 3 with certainty 
10 21 with p=.15 2 with certainty 
11 48 with p=.15 5 with p=.80 
12 9 with p=.15 1 with p=.80 
C1 0 with certainty 1 with p=.75 
C2 0 with certainty 1 with certainty 
C3 9 with p=.10 3 with p=.75 
C4 7 with p=10 2 with certainty 
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Figure 2B shows the information search behavior of 
the participants. Descriptively, it matches our predictions. 
The repeated-play condition elicited higher total sample 
sizes as well as longer evaluation intervals for the 
individual options (samples per transition: average 
number of samples taken per transition in the sampling 
sequence). However, only the contrast for total number of 
samples reaches statistical significance (total: t32.9=2.28, 
p=.029; per transition: t31.8=1.58, p=.124). Again the 
neutral condition closely resembled the single-play 
condition in both sampling variables (total: t49.1=.52, 
p=.609; per transition: t52.1=.85, p=.40), but was at least 
in terms of total sample size marginally different from 
the repeated-play situation (total: t37.9=-1.85, p=.072; per 
transition: t34=-1.07, p=.29).  
So far we have shown that the payoff structure 
independently affected choice and information search in 
the predicted direction. However, we generally predicted 
that information search and choice behavior were 
likewise affected by the induction of a repeated play 
situation in that it was expected to elicit both a higher 
preference for the long run winner as well as higher total 
and per transition sample sizes. To demonstrate this, two 
additional analyses have to be carried out. First, it has to 
be shown that the contrast for H preference is not entirely 
caused by a sampling bias. Hertwig et al. (2004) showed 
how small sample sizes can systematically obscure rare 
outcomes in decisions from experience. When rare 
outcomes are obscured, the option that secures winning 
most of the time can also appear as the option with the 
higher long run expectation. Second, an association 
between the choice preferences and the sampling 
behavior needs to be established. Therefore we tested if 
this pattern of results holds when the qualities of winning 
most of the time – represented by the higher median – 
and higher long run expectation – represented by the 
higher mean – do not coincide in respect to actually 
observed outcomes. Then we evaluate if the preference 
for the higher mean option is associated with the 
sampling behavior. 
Figure 3 shows the proportions of choices that were 
consistent with the higher experienced mean. The 
separate lines distinguish cases where the experienced 
median and mean predict the same (dotted lines) or 
different (solid lines) choices. Focusing on the cases 
where the mean and median do not fall together, it is 
apparent that participants in the repeated play situation 
opted more often for the option with the higher 
experienced mean as compared to the single play 
situation (t49.1=2.72, p=.001). Thus, the differences in 
choices do appear to be associated with different decision 
strategies and not simply differences in observed 
outcomes. The neutral condition again matches the single 
(t48.3=.12, p=.90) but not the repeated play condition 
(t48.8=-2.26, p=.028). Overall, the observed differences 
are all the more convincing given the pattern of results 
for cases where the experienced mean and median fall 
together. Independent of the payoff condition we 
observed stong preferences for the option with the higher 
experienced mean pointing towards very systematic 
Figure 2: (A) Proportion of H choices as a function of the experimental condition. (B) Mean number samples in total and 


















































Now, is the shift in strategy use for the repeated play 
condition associated with changes in the sampling 
behavior? In line with our predictions we found this to be 
the case. Regressing higher mean choices on sample size 
and the group contrast of single and repeated play 
situations yields a significant interaction (t52=-2.73, 
p=.009), while the main effect of the contrast vanishes 
(t52=.54, p=.59). The same pattern was found for samples 
per transition (interaction: t52=-2.36, p=.022; contrast: 
t52=-0.33, p=.746). It was not possible to determine which 
of these sampling variables were more strongly 
associated with the strategy use because they were highly 
correlated (r = .83). In sum, we thus were able to show, 
that the repeated play condition influenced both choice 




The primary aim of our study was to use experience-
based decisions to investigate information search and 
decision making over repeated and single plays. Based on 
prior findings of Hills & Hertwig (2010) we predicted 
that the situations of repeated and single plays would 
elicit information search behavior that has been found to 
be associated with short and long-term maximization, 
respectively. Our results confirm this prediction. 
Participants in the situation of repeated plays – 
particularly those that sampled more avidly and switched 
less frequently between the options – exhibited higher 
preferences for the superior option in the long run. These 
results did not appear to be mediated by a simple 
sampling bias (Hertwig et al., 2004; Fox & Hadar, 2006). 
Rather, they were associated with different decision 
strategies. 
We believe that our findings provide new evidence for 
the theoretical debate on single and repeated-play 
decisions. So far behavioral studies that separated these 
situations have focused entirely on decision outcomes. 
We extend this literature by showing that differences can 
also be demonstrated on more process-oriented measures 
such as information search. Our results imply that 
possibly more is changing over the situations of single 
and repeated play than the weighting of probabilities and 
outcomes (Aloysius, 2007), as suggested by unitary 
theoretical accounts, e.g. prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). We suggest that an overall different 
cognitive approach towards repeated plays is applied. 
These results appear to be consistent with theoretical 
accounts such as Lola Lopes’ (1996, 1999) two-stage 
model. 
Our findings also hold important insights for the 
literature on experienced-based decision making. On all 
of our measures, the standard payoff procedure resulted 
in behavior that resembled the condition where the 
single-play character was strongly emphasized. This 
might not appear surprising as in both cases only single 
draws were taken out of the chosen option. However, in 
the standard realization all decisions contribute to the 
overall payoff. Thus, the whole set of choices could be 
mentally combined (see Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 
1999) and thereby the set of problems could more 
resemble a repeated play situation. In this context our 
findings suggest that under the standard paradigm of 
decisions from experience, all choices are evaluated 
independently. This finding might contribute in the 
explanation of the description-experience gap. 
  In conclusion, we find that single and repeated play 
situations impact more than just choice preferences. The 
way people search for information and specific decision 
strategies change as well. Our findings emphasize the 
distinction between long-term and short-term maximizing 
behavior in human decision-making - a distinction that is 
long established in the literature on animal foraging. 
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